reasons why the world's first organized futures exchange began at Dojima and not elsewhere. Part II discusses the governance and antimanipulation institutions of the Exchange and analyzes Dojima's relative reliance on formal internal rules rather than informal constraints. Part III attempts to measure the efficiency of the institutions discussed in Parts I and II by using price data gathered from eighteenth-and nineteenth-century Japanese documents. Part IV examines the effect of state-provided dispute resolution at Dojima by comparing dispute resolution and performance measures at Dojima before, during, and after the period in which shogunate courts were open to Dojima suits (1773-1784).
I. THE MARKET

A. Economic, Social, and Legal Setting
Around 1600, Ieyasu Tokugawa led a coalition of local lords to victory in battle and established a Japanese national dynasty that would last until the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Though Tokugawa Japan is generally characterized as isolationist and peaceful,9 recent scholarship casts doubt on strong isolationist claims, noting that most Europeans left on their own after losing a trade war to the Dutch, and that Japan was always open to trade with other Asian countries.10 But peaceful it certainly appears to have been, as the Tokugawa unification marked the end of 100 years of civil war and a prelude to the dramatic changes that would occur in the Western-influenced late-nineteenth century.
With peace came growth in population, cities, and commerce. Edo (modern-day Tokyo) became the country's political center, while Osaka -the "country's kitchen" -became the commercial center.
Unlike many other feudal societies, Japan enjoyed a flourishing market economy, a development attributable to a combination of restrictions on foreign trade, a fragmented political system of 250 economically interdependent feudal domains, and the need of feudal leaders to fund expensive, centrally mandated trips to Edo every two years under a system of alternate residence.1l Economic specialization increased, and the port city of Osaka, located near many large rice fields, became a center of agricultural commerce and industry.
The Tokugawa government did not rely on a single currency, but three -gold coin (mostly used in Eastern Japan), silver currency (by weight, mostly used in Western Japan, including Osaka), and copper coin (used nationwide). But currency demand outpaced production, due at least in part to the Tokugawa government's monopoly over gold and silver mines. Local domains turned to substitutes, often minting their own currency.12 Sometimes financial instruments such as promissory notes, bills of exchange, and letters of credit also filled the gap. 13 In part because of its availability and ease of measurement, rice became a substitute currency.l4 Rice, "the most important commodity in Tokugawa society,"15 was the measure by which the shogunate figured its annual budget.16 Many feudal lords collected taxes from peasant subjects in rice and financed their governments by converting rice into currency at markets. Domain lords stored their rice in warehouses in Osaka, and, in a preliminary step toward the creation of an organized marketplace, paid Osaka merchants to manage it as their 
See FUYUJI DOMON, EDO SHONIN NO KEIZAIGAKU [THE ECONOMICS OF TOKUGAWA MERCHANTS] 9 (1996).
See OSAMU WAKITA, KINSEI HOKEN SHAKAI NO KEIZAI KOzO [THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF EARLY MODERN FEUDAL SOCIETY] 23-36 (1963).
ers, artisans, and merchants. The merchant status group was not monolithic, including both merchant property owners and day laborers. But merchants were clearly at the bottom of the social hierarchy, above only the extremely underprivileged, and were often subject to persecution from above by feudal lords in the form of asset confiscation and from below by peasants in the form of arson and theft. 18 The Tokugawa legal system was one of fragmented federalism.19 Tokugawa law applied in principle only in territory controlled directly by the central government, or perhaps more precisely, the Tokugawa feudal lord -about one-third of Japan, which included Osaka. The remainder of Japan was governed by a hodgepodge of feudal laws, the only guiding principle being a supremacy clause of sorts that mandated (in 1615) local statutes not contravene those of the government.20 While property rights were not afforded statutory protection, local domains enforced "de facto property rights."21 Spotted use of legal precedents may have occurred in some regions,22 but it was not until 1742 that important statutes and precedents were assembled into a code. 23 By most accounts, dispute resolution was hierarchical, individualistic, and unpredictable. The judicial system relied on the Tokugawa social structure to control and channel disputes. Disputants first brought their claims to the local village leader and were referred to the next level in the hierarchy only if they could not be resolved in the first instance. The government explicitly discouraged suits against superiors or against members of another social status group, perhaps to preclude potential threats to its sovereignty.24 The primary goals of those in charge of the legal system appear to have been settlement and the maintenance of social order, goals made more attainable by the in- Chozaemon's efforts, and asks him to purchase 500 ryo worth of rice on his behalf. Chozaemon is eager to help, but because he has no warehouse to store that much rice on top of his own, he makes a deal. Pay me just 60 ryo now, he says, and when I sell the rice next year, you'll pay me the remaining 440 ryo along with interest at the rate of 3 sho (about a pound) of rice, and I'll give you the profits. But if the price of rice falls, and it's not profitable to sell, I'll keep your 60 ryo. Fortunately for both, the price skyrockets. Chozaemon realizes that he can do this again, and does so regularly, issuing 100 ryo of rice "receipts" for a two percent down payment, taking a middleman's fee, and setting contract maturity dates of two to three months.26
In the following years, several feudal lords begin to follow Chozaemon's example, issuing rice receipts that entitle the bearer to rice from the lords' agent-managed Osaka warehouses. By issuing receipts, lords could ensure a steady income stream from their otherwise seasonal and weather-dependent product. Like other promissory notes or bills of exchange that would dominate the Tokugawa merchant economy,27 the receipts entitled the bearer to a certain quantity of goods -rice in an Osaka warehouse. But unlike other goods on 25. See, e.g., HENDERSON, supra note 23, at 101, 132-62 (noting that "criminal-civil distinction was not clearly observed and Tokugawa practice" and including transcript of civil suit in which local official routinely threatens death penalty).
26. See DOHI, supra note 6, at 32-33; SUGIE, supra note 6, at 8-9.
27. By the end of the Tokugawa period, 99% of payments between merchants were settled by bills. See SAKUDO, supra note 12, at 249. which promissory notes or bills of exchange were based, rice was itself a form of currency, and accordingly, these rice receipts, or bills, soon acquired a currency-like quality with a value independent of the underlying physical rice. Warehouses routinely issued "empty" bills (kumai kitte) that were traded as credit instruments rather than actual entitlements to physical rice, which did not exist in the issuing warehouse.28 Records of the Osaka city commissioner show that by 1654 (and perhaps several years earlier), Osaka traders had formed a functioning market for these rice bills.29
The trading house of Saburaemon Yodoya, in the Kitahama district of Osaka, became the primary trading site for rice bills.30 As Ihara Saikaku, the son of an Osaka merchant and one of Japan's most gifted novelists, wrote some 300 years ago:
The Kitahama Rice Market, as is fitting of Osaka's position as the largest port in Japan, sometimes had speculative transactions of 50,000 kan [42.6 tons] in a two-hour period. The rice was crammed to the tops of the warehouses. People bought and sold by speculating based on the condition of the sky, the evening winds, and the morning rains. They argued over a mere one or two bu of silver, the market was full of people, and people who had never met before would trade thousands or even ten thousands of koku of rice, and once they had clapped hands over it, neither party would breach the contract.31
Saikaku's prose suggests a glorious market of which the state might have been proud. But authorities' initial larger concern was urban congestion, as traffic jams on Kitahama Road outside of the House of Yodoya were a common occurrence. In 1688 the government requested that rice traders move their market across the river to Dojima (today a few blocks from Osaka Station). 33. Yodoya's wealth was astounding; if the commonly cited inventory of his wealth is accurate, he was a thousand times richer than other merchants, was owed 100 million ryo (several times the national income of Japan), and the amount confiscated by the government was equal to two hundred years of shogunate income. See, e.g., E.S. Crawcour, Changes in plays of wealth.34 But some scholars suggest that Yodoya had been overeager in enforcing loans made to influential lords in Kyushu and Shikoku,35 while others claim that the shogunate actually closed Yodoya because it wanted to halt futures transactions, which it considered gambling.36 Gambling or not, the government had additional reasons to stop the trade -it believed that futures transactions led to artificially inflated physical rice prices, thereby leading to general price inflation.37 Prohibited or not, market participants continued to trade rice bills in futures transactions on the black market in front of Yodoya's house. Only spot trading (the trading of physical rice) continued legally at Dojima.
C. Formal Establishment
In 1716, Yoshimune became the eighth Tokugawa shogun, taking over a government with deteriorating finances. Yoshimune soon began a series of economic reforms, including a reduction of government spending and increases in land tax collection in 1721, and restrictions on feudal lord extravagance in 1724. One of Yoshimune's greatest concerns was falling rice prices. As Table 1 Low rice prices were a concern because members of the military received their salaries in rice, which they subsequently sold for cash to brokers,38 and because feudal lords repaid loans from local temples and shrines in rice.39 The government could easily inflate rice prices by controlling supply; the trick was to do so without causing widespread inflation. Just as the previous government had outlawed futures transactions because of their perceived tendency to raise rice prices (and rice prices alone), Yoshimune -later dubbed the "rice shogun" -decided to employ them precisely for that reason in order to appease demands from the military and lords. In 1730, after receiving a petition from Tokyo merchants in Osaka (whom the government apparently felt it could trust more than the locals), SHIMAMOTO, supra note 6, at 9-10; SUGIE, supra note 6, at 31. The decree applied specifically to futures contracts. Spot transactions at Dojima apparently had separate legal treatment. At some point in the An'ei era (1772-1780), the shogunate systematically gave spot transaction suits precedence over other suits, rendering quick judgments and accepting filings on days other than the two-a-month "suing days" specified for such matters. See SHIMAMOTO, supra note 6, at 20. 
Standardized Terms
A forward contract is an agreement for the future delivery of an asset at a specified price at the end of a designated period of time. A futures exchange is a market in which participants trade standardized forward contracts. Futures contracts thus normally have standardized terms: a typical modern London Metal Exchange futures contract, for instance, specifies quotation unit, grade of material, quantity, price, delivery terms and procedures, and contract duration.45 At Dojima, the standard trading unit was 100 koku, each contract was equal to 100 koku, and minimum price movements were measured at one koku. Delivery terms and procedures depended on the type of rice (rice was chosen by the market from the area that had the best harvest, for instance, Kaga in the summer) and the warehouse in question. Because rice could be "branded" by harvest location, geography provided a convenient grading mechanism. 46 Contract duration was fixed by a trimester trading calendar, consisting of a spring term (January 8 -April 28), a summer term (May 7 -October 9), and a winter term (October 17 -December 24).47 Contracts had to be settled by the closing date of each term, and the end of each term included a three-day liquidation period. The market closed at the end of each term, and no trades for the following period could be made between terms. Although the system restricted the ability of traders to contract freely, it also provided an institutional constraint to prevent transactions with infinite time horizons that no market -including most modern markets -could handle. Dojima's major innovation was the "book" transaction system (choaimai) for recording such trades. In the book transaction system, when traders reached an agreement, the names of the parties and the amount of rice traded were recorded in the market "book." The parties were then required to complete the transaction through cash settlement by the close of the trading term. Under this system, neither party required rice or cash when they made the bargain, making the practice well-suited for hedging. The book transaction system enabled organized futures trading at Dojima. 
Transferability
Futures contracts are readily transferable, which allows for closing out a position by taking the opposite side of the transaction. At Dojima, futures contracts were easily and commonly transferred, and parties could effectively close out positions by entering the opposite transaction (a buy versus a sell for the same amount of rice) on the book. Thus, as in modern futures markets, Dojima traders routinely closed out positions without purchasing the underlying physical quantity of rice, thereby reducing transaction costs.
Auction Trading
Futures are usually traded in a pure auction model, unlike stock exchanges, which often use a specialist system. Dojima, like the famous hand signals and shouts of the Chicago market pits, also relied on an auction system. No specialist was necessary to make a trade.
Price Limits
Price limits are maximum daily price changes that a contract specifies can occur. When a futures contract moves outside the price limit, no transactions can take place on that day. Such limits are used to prevent large fluctuations. Although Dojima futures contracts appear to have had no formal price limits, as Part II discusses, another institution -the firebox system -performed a similar function.
Price Discovery
According to theory, futures market prices communicate price information to underlying spot markets, and that information moves spot prices in the right direction.48 The Dojima market performed a similar price discovery function for physical rice transactions. The data presented in Part III provide empirical support, which is at least tentatively buttressed by two bits of anecdotal evidence. First, as a rule, trading in the Dojima futures market began two hours before trading in the Dojima spot market, suggesting that traders used futures information in their spot trading.49 Second, Dojima price information was so significant that it was transmitted immediately to Edo (Tokyo), 
Clearinghouses
In futures markets, a clearinghouse (normally an independent corporation) guarantees a transaction by entering into both sides of a futures contract. When parties in futures markets reach an agreement, they actually contract with the clearinghouse as a third party. The clearinghouse becomes the seller to the buyer of the contract, and the buyer to the seller. In so doing, it guarantees performance and reduces risk from market transactions. It also reduces transaction costs by simplifying the process of unwinding positions by the settlement (delivery) date by allowing a party to contract with the clearinghouse and avoid searching for the original counterparty to the transaction.
Remarkably, the seventeenth-century Dojima Exchange had such a clearinghouse institution. Initially, moneychangers, which numbered more than one thousand in 1700,52 changed rice into cash -a function made necessary largely because of the lack of a single unified currency. As transactions became more numerous and complex, merchants relied more on these moneychangers -now functioning as brokers -to hold their deposits, and eventually to manage their affairs. These brokers soon developed into full-fledged clearinghouses, serving as transaction intermediaries between contracting parties. While forward contract trading apparently occurred in Europe at about the same time as Dojima, the clearinghouse system sets Dojima apart as the first formalized futures exchange.53 
Clearinghouse Requirements
Clearinghouses must be compensated for their undertaking of risk, and compensation normally comes in the form of margin and daily settlement requirements. Clearinghouses set margin requirements for members, who must maintain specified amounts in their margin accounts to continue trading with the clearinghouse. Daily settlement requirements mitigate against the possibility of cumulative losses. Dojima clearinghouses had similar requirements, requiring margin payments to incur trading risk and requiring traders to enter their transactions into the house's trading book at the end of the trading day. The clearinghouses employed a ten-day mark-to-market mechanism, adjusting margin accounts every ten days to reflect changes in the value of traders' positions. As in modern futures markets, customers who experienced gains over the ten-day period could withdraw funds from margin accounts, while those who experienced losses had their margin account balance reduced. And as in modern futures markets, lending institutions arose to help traders finance margin requirements.54
The historical record suggests at least four reasons why Dojima participants were able to construct these formal market institutions at least 100 years before similar institutions developed in Europe. First, the shogunate's policy, intentional or otherwise, of allowing competition among three forms of currency fostered the development of money exchange brokers.55 These brokers formed the basis of the clearinghouse institutions and designed alternative payment systems (such as bills of credit) that led to the development of standardized futures contracts. Second, the feudal political system made financial demands on lords but did not limit their ability to exert power in the marketplace. Third, because rice was both an alternative currency and a seasonal, weather-sensitive commodity, it encouraged formal hedging by these lords. Finally, socioeconomic and even religious structures may have played a role. Merchants, divorced from the land, had both the ability and incentives to create a central marketplace in Osaka, and unlike some of their European counterparts, were unfettered by a Christian or Muslim moral code that discouraged or prohibited debt and usury.56 
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II. RULES OF ORDER
As a full-fledged futures exchange in a relatively primitive legal and economic system, Dojima traders needed to devise governance mechanisms to ensure market order. This Part argues that while relational contracting played a role, the Exchange chose to rely more heavily on formal internal rules and institutions than on relational constraints.
A. Governance
Exchanges have historically been commercial mutual nonprofit institutions managed by boards of directors and standing committees pursuant to by-laws -possibly a consequence of member heterogeneity.68 Dojima employed a similar structure. Until the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the Exchange remained a nonprofit association of traders. Although Exchange expenses were originally apportioned among members, the warehouses eventually took over payment.69 But while warehouses paid the fees, Exchange members elected Exchange officials.
Formal governance of the Exchange was preceded by monopolistic, geographically-based rice trader coalitions formed shortly after the passage of the 1730 law legalizing futures trading. From these coalitions came Exchange directors. Exchange members elected five "annual directors" in a general election. They also elected five "monthly directors," but the coalition system ensured that the heads of the five largest groups of coalitions became monthly directors by default. Annual directors conducted the activities of the Exchange with some measure of independence, while monthly directors more directly represented member and coalition interests, thereby likely reducing agency costs.
The system had at least one drawback. In order to maintain independence, annual directors were required to cease trading upon taking office. But because annual director salaries could not compete with profits that a director might otherwise earn from trading, few potential directors wanted the job. Compensation aside, the job was not an easy one, as directors were required to attend the Exchange daily. Those Determining why Dojima rules differ from other markets -why traders adopted the firebox system -is more difficult. Perhaps the answer lies in homogeneity. See Pirrong, supra, at 158. But the degree of homogeneity of financial interests that existed among merchants, which comprised a very broad status group, is unclear at best, and the size of the exchange points toward heterogeneity. See Pirrong, supra, at 162 (noting that enforcement is lower when exchange membership is large). Perhaps the answer lies in the inability to costshift. Pirrong argues that consumers of exchange services may bear the bulk of costs of manipulation, not exchange members. See Pirrong, supra, at 164. But while Dojima may have had fewer external consumers than some modern markets, they did exist. See supra text accompanying note 75. Perhaps a better answer is that the firebox system was adopted simply to determine objectively a closing time, and its antimanipulation effects were an inadvertent bonus. Although the firebox system had its quirks (for instance, the Exchange apparently would void a trading day even if rain extinguished the fire),88 it played an important role in market management. Occasionally it created a ruckus, as on-a-roll traders had their assistants fan the wick, and losers of the day tried to extinguish the flame.89 But generally the firebox system appears to have been an effective method of curbing abuses such as cornering or dumping. Made aware of a potential manipulation scheme, traders simply stopped trading. At the end of the day, no closing price could be found, all transactions would be voided, and the potential abuser would not profit. The system thus encouraged mutual monitoring of trading activity.
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It is possible that the firebox system may have also been used to punish nonmanipulating traders. But no record of such behavior exists, a fact possibly attributable to collective action problems in organizing a punitive strike. At the least, the mechanism does not suffer from the unappealing qualities that arbitrary fixed position limits set by outside enforcers sometimes do.
Coalitions
Finally, in addition to the above rules, the geographical coalitions that arose after 17309o discouraged abuses through reputational 87. See SHIMAMOTO, supra note 6, at 46. First, in some cases, such as the trader licensing system, Dojima participants had no choice between rules and inter-trader reputation, as the state mandated the decision. Participants might have preferred an internally devised membership constraint that might have led to greater reliance on reputational bonds, but they were not given the option. Indeed, they actually formulated some of their own internal licensing requirements that were ultimately co-opted by the state.
Second, as Lisa Bernstein notes in her analysis of the cotton industry, reputation may be more important in industries in which grading of goods is difficult.92 Because rice could easily be graded by geographic origin,93 it may have been more easily subject to relatively rigid internal rules. Were rice as difficult to grade as diamonds, perhaps intertrader reputational constraints would have been more important. 
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First Futures Exchange
Finally, unlike many of the other self-regulated commercial markets analyzed in the law and economics literature, participants at Dojima did not choose to opt out of the legal system. Given the choice, they might have preferred shogunate-imposed rules and support. But while the shogunate's 1730 edict explicitly adopted many existing Dojima institutions, it forced participants themselves to organize many aspects of the Exchange, including governance and dispute resolution mechanisms.94
III. MARKET PERFORMANCE
How effective were Dojima institutions in reducing transaction costs and establishing an ordered market? In some studies of selfregulating commercial markets, a lack of data forces analysts into relatively ad hoc conclusions: private ordering in such markets is efficient because long-lasting; were it inefficient, these markets would not exist. The argument applies here as well -the Exchange is unlikely to have been terribly inefficient, given its long history and high trading volume for such an extended period of time.
But fortunately, Dojima provides relevant data, which offer more precise alternatives than mere longevity, but not necessarily less assailable conclusions, for judging efficiency. The Exchange can also be examined by analyzing the spread between spot and futures prices. Intuitively, one might expect futures prices to exceed spot prices: because of carrying costs such as interest, storage costs, and insurance, a buyer can purchase today one sack of rice for less money than he can purchase the right to purchase that rice in the future. When futures prices exceed spot prices, the situation is termed "contango" or "normal carry," or, in eighteenth-century Japanese, "upper margin" (uwazaya). But short-term price increases, low carrying costs, and premiums paid by producers for the ability to hedge their own anticipated supplies, can often result in higher spot prices than futures prices, a situation known as "backwardation" or "inverse carrying charge,"1'3 or, in eighteenth-century Japanese, In each period, as the figures show, if one did not know the exact closing date, finding the point at which spot prices and forward prices converge would serve as a good indicator. In each period, the market performed as theory predicts -although prices varied during the course of the trading period, the lack of carrying costs ensured that they converge at the end of each period.
Aggregate data tend to confirm the results of the individual period data. For the period 1763-1780, I calculate the average difference in closing prices to be .04 monme, and the average difference in nonclosing prices to be .11 monme. In percentage terms, on average, closing forward prices were a miniscule .07% higher than closing spot prices, while non-closing forward prices were a full .35% higher. In short, the data suggest that the market performed just as theory would predict.
IV. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The data presented in Part III indicate that the Exchange performed the tasks of risk reduction and price discovery well and that its prices accord with economic theories of market efficiency. In this Part, I examine the murkier relationship between state regulation and Exchange efficiency.
A. The 1730 System
The 1730 shogunate decision to disallow suits over futures contracts'13 was part of a broader legal and institutional plan. Although crossover occurred, the shogunate generally distinguished between two types of suits: criminal proceedings (ginmisuji) and civil proceedings (deirisuji).l4 Civil proceedings were further divided into three types: suits involving close relations (nakamagoto); "money suits" (kanekuji), which were suits "based on unsecured money claims upon which interest was charged;""5 and "main suits" (honkuji), which were claims based on general property rights and involved security.
The ability to sue in shogunate courts depended on the type of proceeding, which in turn was determined by the relationship of the parties. The shogunate prohibited suits involving close relations, specifically excluding suits involving rotating credit associations, contracts among several persons to start certain businesses, and controversies arising from gate receipts at entertainment events such as plays and sumo matches. In each case, the shogunate, because of the close relationship among parties to such transactions (including the latter rela- tionship between theater proprietors and money-backing producers), withheld jurisdiction and forced parties to such private transactions to solve their own disputes.1l6
The shogunate also distinguished between money suits and main suits, the former being strictly limited by minimum amounts in controversy requirements and the constraint that damages be paid in installments rather than as a lump sum.17 Courts more liberally heard main suits, namely those most likely to occur between strangers.
Potential explanations for these distinctions might be the elimination of court congestion, paucity of judicial resources, or the shogunate's lack of real regulatory power within the federalist system. These factors likely were real concerns. But the shogunate's policy of tying enforceability to relation-based criteria, along with its broad policy of coalition establishment in other contexts, supports the claim of several Japanese legal and economic scholars who suggest an additional reason why the shogunate limited suits: to encourage the private resolution of problems that might arise from merchant contracts.118 By requiring private dispute resolution, the shogunate may have hoped to provide incentives for parties to develop efficient rules and norms to avoid disputes, thus spurring economic growth through market development without expending government resources.119
As with other relationship-based transactions, the state prohibited suits at Dojima altogether. Forced out of the legal system, the Exchange had to develop dispute resolution institutions on its own. Unfortunately, little has been recorded about the specifics of Dojima dispute resolution. Exchange directors appointed a conciliation committee, which apparently had broad powers to resolve disputes, and promulgated rules largely on an individual basis with nominal regard to internal precedent.120 's founding, in 1746, 1789, 1797, and 1843) But note the sudden drop in suits in 1785 following the discontinuance of the shogunate dispute resolution system in 1784. Contemporaneous accounts state that the system's 1784 discontinuance occurred because the shogunate, with limited resources, was unable to keep up with the demand for dispute resolution services.130 To the extent that such accounts are correct, the shogunate's response is nonetheless interesting. Instead of devoting more governmental resources to the pressing problem of solving disputes, the shogunate apparently abandoned the system altogether.
See RYOSUKE ISHII, KINSEI TORIHIKIHOSHI [HISTORY OF EARLY MODERN COMMERCIAL LAW] 52-58 (1982). On ten occasions in the Tokugawa period (about every twenty years, and four times after the Exchange
The shogunate's abandonment of the system, the debatable absence of a sustained increase in post-1773 litigation (to the extent suggested by the data), or both, might be explained by the quality of shogunate legal rules. Like other Tokugawa coalitions, Dojima "performed important functions for the Tokugawa economy as well, the most important of which was the establishment of rules for mercantile practices. Because the government did not establish a body of customary law to enforce business transactions, [coalitions] were forced to do so by themselves."131 It is unclear the extent to which shogunate courts would have applied customary law in trading cases at the end of the eighteenth century. To the extent that shogunate courts did not apply customary law and were thus less predictable than a conciliation committee's application of Dojima internal rules,132 plaintiffs would likely have preferred to bring suit in shogunate court only in cases in which the Dojima conciliation committee would have ruled against them.133 To the extent that Tokugawa courts did apply customary law (as they often did in commercial cases),134 assuming that they applied it the same way as private courts, trader disputants would likely be no better off in court than before the exchange conciliation committee. Perhaps some traders rationally preferred to rely on familiar private internal institutions rather than public legal ones with which they had little experience. Perhaps some traders could receive more favorable judgments in one court than another, perhaps because of institutional factors, or perhaps because the systems were rigged one way or another. Whatever the case, while it may generally be 130 preferable for public lawmakers to provide default rules rather than mandatory ones,135 giving plaintiffs a forum-shopping option at Dojima likely reduced the predictability of dispute resolution.
C. Comparing the Two Systems
The shogunate announced and implemented its reverse-course decision to allow suits based on trading at Dojima on designated "suing days" in 1773. If privately ordered internal rules were functioning efficiently, the decision should not have drastically altered market arrangements. Although the effect on litigation rates is unclear, market institutions remained intact after 1773. The discontinuance of the edict after only twelve years also calls into question the efficacy of the shogunate courts. We can also look to five more precise measures to determine the effect of the decree: price trends, trading volume, spotfutures correlation, volatility, and price.136
First, it is useful simply to eyeball 1773 price changes, as shown in Admittedly, there are problems with using bill issuance as a proxy for volume. Because many rice receipts bore no relation to the issuing warehouse's actual inventory, Dojima traders effectively traded contracts, not rice, and accordingly measuring the size of rice bills may be somewhat artificial. Second, some of these rice bills were merely unbacked bonds not traded at Dojima. Still, assuming that these factors pre-edict period than during the period in which the edict was enforced. Of course, factors other than the edict may have been responsible for the lower correlation of spot and futures prices, and the correlation in the pre-edict period may have been so high that there was little room for increase by the edict. Thus, while interesting that the best measure of the price discovery function did not increase during the period in which contracts were legally enforceable, the analysis is at best uncertain.
Fourth, I compared the volatility of spot and futures prices before, during, and after the edict, by calculating the standard deviation of logarithmic price differences, or geometric returns.142 The results of annual average log-volatility calculations for the three periods are reported in Table 3.143 As the table shows, tution of the Japanese economy. Whatever problems Dojima may have had, it was apparently efficient enough to squelch strong demands for reorganization. As this Article has shown, one of the reasons for its success -whether measured solely by longevity or by the more formal methods detailed herein -was likely its system of privately ordered rules and organizational constraints. The shadow of the law was always present. But anecdotal information and price data indicate that Dojima functioned for centuries in accordance with modern theories of efficient markets without direct government intervention or strict regulation. The data from the shogunate's 1773 experiment in public dispute resolution are more ambiguous, but they certainly do not present a strong case for government intervention.
